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Abstract:  We examine a simple theory of altruism in which players payoffs are linear in
their own monetary income and their opponent’s.  The weight on opponent’s income is
private information and varies in the population, depending, moreover, on what the
opponent’s coefficient is believed to be.   Using results of ultimatum experiments and the
final round of a centipede experiment, we are able to pin down relatively accurately what
the distribution of altruism (and spite) in the population is.  This distribution is then used
with a reasonable degree of success to explain the results of the earlier rounds of
centipede and the results of some public goods contribution games.   In addition we show
that in a market game where the theory of selfish players does quite well, the theory of
altruism makes exactly the same predictions as the theory of selfish players.
© This document is copyrighted by the author.   You may freely reproduce and distribute
it electronically or in print, provided it is distributed in its entirety, including this
copyright notice.
                                                
1 This work was supported in part by the UCLA Academic Senate and by NSF Grant  SBR-93-20695.
Discussions with Drew Fudenberg, Tom Palfrey, Robert Rosenthal, John Van Huyck and comments by
participants at the University of Chicago Theory Workshop, the UCLA Theory Workshop, the
Harvard/MIT joint theory workshop and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Theory
Workshop are also gratefully acknowledged.  I would also like to thank Ramon Marimon and two
anonymous referees for their guidance.
2 Department of Economics, UCLA.1
1. Introduction
Standard theory applied to the study of experiments generally examines a
refinement of Nash equilibrium such as subgame perfection, and assumes that
participants are selfish in the sense that they care only about their own monetary income.
3
Some (but not all) experiments cannot be explained by this theory.  Two robust sets of
experiments of this sort are those on ultimatum bargaining and on public goods
contribution games.
In ultimatum bargaining, the first player proposes a division of a fixed amount of
money that may be accepted or rejected by the second player.  According to the theory,
any demand that leaves the second player with anything should be accepted, and
consequently the proposer should either demand the entire amount or at least the greatest
amount less than the entire amount.  In fact proposers do not demand nearly this amount,
generally demanding between 50-60% of the total, and ungenerous demands that are
significantly less than the entire amount are frequently rejected.
In public goods contribution games, players may make a costly donation to a
common pool that provides a social benefit greater than the contribution.  Because of the
free rider problem, it is typically a dominant strategy not to contribute anything.  Never
the less, with as many as 10 or more players, some players contribute to the common
pool.
One explanation of these phenomena is that the equilibrium concept is wrong, and
this has been explored by a variety of authors such as Binmore and Samuelson [1995].
However, such explanations are difficult to accept since in public goods games dominant
strategies are involved, while in ultimatum bargaining it is puzzling that many demands
leaving the second player with 30% or more of the total amount are rejected.  The
                                                
3 There is much informal discussion of fairness, but little in the way of formal modeling applied to
experiments.2
rejection of such an offer is not a failure of equilibrium theory, but a failure of the
assumption of selfish players.
An alternative line of explanation is that players are not really selfish.  One such
explanation that is frequently discussed, particularly by the experimenters themselves, is
that some notion of fairness plays a role in individual decision making.  Rabin [1992] has
proposed a formal model of what this might mean.  The model presented here is similar
in spirit to Rabin’s model, but does not depart from the ordinary assumptions of game
theory. Moreover, Rabin examined only qualitative predictions of his model.  The goal of
this paper is to examine the quantitative implications of the theory: to what extent can a
simple model of players who are not selfish can explain the data from a variety of
experiments, including both ultimatum and public goods games.  A similar effort can be
found in Andreoni and Miller [1996].  That effort differs from this one in focusing only
on public goods contribution games, and on altruism, but not spitefulness.  In addition,
they allow players to have non-linear preferences over contributions.
4  They find, as do
we, a remarkable degree of consistency in the attitude of players towards one another in
different games.
The basic theory is that players care not only about their own monetary payoffs,
but also about their opponent’s monetary payoffs.  The simplest such model is of the type
described by many authors, (see Ledyard [1995] for example) in which utility is a linear
function of both the player’s own monetary payoff, and his opponent’s.  It is convenient
to normalize the coefficient on the own monetary payoff to one.   The question is then,
what is the coefficient on the other player’s payoffs?  Public goods contributions games
suggest that this coefficient should be positive; ultimatum bargaining suggest that it
                                                
4 They assume that utility is defined over contributions in the particular game at hand, and not over total
wealth.  This, combined with non-linearity, can lead to some of the same paradoxes that occur when non-
Von Neumann Morgenstern preferences are considered in decision theory.  For example, it is possible to
construct a series of problems involving contributions in such a way that the optimal solutions to the
individual problems are sub-optimal in the joint problem of solving the problems simultaneously.3
should be negative (so that offers will be rejected).  We adopt the point of view that the
coefficient differs between different individuals in the population, with some individuals
having positive coefficients and some negative coefficients, and with each individual’s
coefficient being private information.  The theory gains strength from the hypothesis that
this distribution is fixed across games of different types, so that the same distribution of
coefficients should be used to explain, for example, both ultimatum bargaining and public
goods contribution games.
In fact this simple model is inadequate to explain even the results of ultimatum
bargaining.  From the rejection rates in the experiment we can calculate how many
players moving second must be spiteful and how spiteful they must be.  However, the
players moving first must be drawn from the same population, so we can use the
distribution of spitefulness calculated from the rejection rates to compute what demands
should be made by the players moving first.  In fact the demands that should be made,
according to the theory, are substantially larger than those observed in the data.
As a result of this, we are led to a more complicated model of altruism.
Introspection suggests that players care not only about other players’ utility, but also that
their attitudes towards other players depend on how they feel they are being treated.  One
way to model this is to use the psychological game approach of Rabin [1983] and
Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stachetti [1989].  However, these models are complicated, and
depart quite radically from ordinary choice theory.  We will discuss the Rabin model in
greater detail below. As an alternative we propose a simpler model with the same flavor:
player’s weights on opponents monetary payoffs depends both on their own coefficient of
altruism (or spite), and on what they believe their opponents coefficient to be.  In
particular, a more positive weight is placed on the money received by an opponent who is
believed to be more altruistic, and a more negative weight on one that is believed to be
more spiteful.  Notice that the game played is now a signaling game, since players actions
will potentially reveal how altruistic they are, and their opponents care about this.4
It is useful to think what consequence this has in ultimatum bargaining.   First,
larger demands are a signal of greater spite.  Hence the degree of altruism needed to
explain the rejections is less than it would be in the absence of the signaling effect: even a
relatively altruistic player may behave meanly to a player believed to be spiteful.  In
addition to demands being lower because players are less spiteful, demands are lower
because an altruistic player will realize that acceptance of a large demand is a signal of an
altruistic opponent, and consequently will be less desirous of making such a demand.
Using this model, we examine ultimatum bargaining experimental results due to
Roth et al [1991].  We are able to fit the data quite well using the model, and pin down
most of the distribution of altruism, except that the data contains little information about
how altruistic the altruistic players are.
The departure of preferences from selfish preferences is substantial, so we next
examine whether the model is consistent with other experiments in which the selfish
theory together with subgame perfection has worked well.    One example of such an
experiment is the market experiment also reported in Roth et al.   Here the selfish theory
predicts the competitive equilibrium, and this is in fact what is observed.  However, the
structure of the game is such that there is little opportunity for transferring utility to or
from other players.  As a result we show that regardless of how altruism is distributed in
the population, there exist equilibria in which the coefficient of altruism does not matter,
and that consequently these equilibria are the same as the equilibria of the selfish model.
We then turn to another well-known experiment inconsistent with selfishness and
subgame perfection, the variation on grab-a-dollar studied by McKelvey and Palfrey
[1992].  In this experiment a player may either grab or pass.  If he passes the money is
doubled and his opponent gets the move, except in the final round.  The grabber gets 80%
of the money, his opponent 20%.  This is structured so that with selfish players the unique
Nash equilibrium is to grab immediately.   In fact only 8% of the population does so.
However, as in ultimatum bargaining, there is also a simple failure of decision theory. A5
substantial fraction of players choose to give money away in the final round.  So many do
so that it is optimal for a selfish player to stay in as long as possible in hopes of getting
lucky and meeting an altruistic opponent in the final round.  The distribution of altruism
from ultimatum is applied to study this game.  The play in the final round pins down the
extent to which the altruistic part of the population is altruistic, a parameter that could not
be identified from the ultimatum experiment.  This gives a complete distribution of
altruism, and we find that play in the earlier rounds is generally consistent with this
distribution.  This is a genuine test of the theory in the sense that there are no free
parameters available to explain play in the early rounds.
Finally, we turn to a public goods experiment by Isaac and Walker [1988].  Here
the model we use imperfectly represents the way in which the experiment was conducted,
and the results of the experiments are not perfectly consistent with the distribution of
altruism calculated in the other experiments.  Never the less the amount of altruism found
in the public goods experiments is reasonably consistent with the amount and degree of
altruism calculated from the other experiments.
In our concluding section we discuss in more detail the extent to which the simple
theory succeeds in explaining experiments, and speculate about how it might apply in
other experiments. One important issue we do not address is the issue of why players
should be altruistic or spiteful. It is natural to speculate about evolutionary explanations
for preferences of this type, and perhaps future research will identify evolutionary forces
that lead to the types of preferences modeled here.
2.  Altruistic Preferences
We will be considering n person games with players in =1, , K .  At terminal
nodes of the extensive form, player i receives a direct utility of ui.  Player i also has a












where  01 ££ l .  The objective of players is to maximize their adjusted utility.   The
adjusted utility reflects the player’s own utility, and their regard for their opponents.  If
ai > 0 we refer to the player as altruistic, as such a player has a positive regard for his
opponents.  If ai = 0 we refer to the player as selfish, the usual case.  If ai < 0 we refer to
the player as spiteful.  The assumption that -< < 11 ai  means that no player has a higher
regard for his opponents (positive or negative) than for himself.
The coefficient l  reflects the fact that players may have a higher regard for
altruistic opponents than spiteful ones.  When l=0 the model is one of pure altruism of
the type discussed by Ledyard [1995] as an explanation of the results of public goods
contribution games.   When l>0 the model can be regarded as incorporating an element
of fairness, not in the sense that players have a particular target they consider “fair,” but
in the sense that they are willing to be more altruistic to an opponent who is more
altruistic towards them.  One of our major conclusions is that l = 0 is not consistent with
data from the ultimatum game.
  Obviously the coefficient  ai  is not independent of the units in which utility is
measured, and utility must be measured in the “same” interpersonally comparable units
for all players.  The linearity of payoffs in opponents’ utility may be taken as a convenient
approximation.  It has the important implication that players respect each other’s
preferences over outcomes and gambles.  In general players regard for one another may
depend on who the opponent is, but in the types of experiments we will be considering,
players interact with each other anonymously, so regarding all opponents in a symmetric
manner seems not only sensible, but necessary.
Prior to the start of play, players are drawn independently from a population with
a distribution of altruism coefficients represented by a common cumulative distribution
function  Fa i () .  Each player i’s altruism coefficient ai  is privately known, while the7
distribution F is common knowledge.  Consequently, we model a particular game as a
Bayesian game, augmented by the private information about types.  It is of some
importance in our analysis that players may reveal information about their altruism
coefficient through their play.  This can both act as a signal of how they are likely to play
in the future, and may change opponents’ attitudes towards them (when l>0).
In studying experiments, we will identify the participants’ utility with their
monetary income from the experiment.  Since the sums of money involved are trivial, it is
hard to believe that curvature in the utility function can play much of a role in explaining
behavior in the experiments.  It is important to note, however, that the money that is not
received by the participants reverts to the experimenter, and there is no reason for the
subjects to feel differently about the experimenter than the other subjects.  However, it
does not seem sensible to identify the utility of the experimenter with the amount of
money that reverts to him.  Instead we will assume that the marginal utility of the
experimenter for money that is not disbursed to the subjects is zero, so that in effect, from
the subjects point of view, the money is thrown away, and the altruism coefficient ai
does not matter.  Notice that it is possible to design experiments to control more carefully
for the effect of money that is not received by the subjects.  Rather than having the money
revert to the experimenter, one subject can be chosen to be the residual claimant with all
money not disbursed to the subjects being given to the residual claimant, who does not
otherwise participate in the experiment.  In this case, the utility of money not going to the
participants other than the residual claimant can be identified also with money income,
and the residual claimant should be viewed by the other subjects as having the population
mean value of ai .  According to the theory, this should have an effect on the outcome of
the experiment.
Our basic notion of equilibrium is that of sequential equilibrium: each player
optimizes given preferences and beliefs that are derived from a limit of strictly mixed
perturbations from equilibrium play and Bayes law.  As a technical aside, note that all the8
games considered here are relatively simple, and sequentiality in these games coincides
with the simpler notion of a perfect Bayes Nash equilibrium.   As all the distributions
over types F we will consider have finite support, for any given monetary payoffs in a
game, our theory of preferences induces an ordinary Bayesian game.  This game can be
analyzed by the ordinary tools of game theory: there are no new theorems or results about
games of this type.  The general theorems about sequential equilibria from Kreps and
Wilson [1982b] apply directly.  In particular, introducing altruistic preferences need not
eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria.   However, we should emphasize that the number
of Nash equilibria is reduced by means of sensible refinements.  The use of refinements
has fallen into disrepute in the study of experiments, because these refinements (including
sequentiality and subgame perfection) do quite poorly in describing actual play.
However, that is not the case in this theory: once preferences for altruism and spite are
taken into account refinements do relatively well.  Indeed, all the equilibria we explicitly
discuss are not only sequential, but satisfy the obvious monotonicity requirement on
beliefs in a signaling game: beliefs are that the type most likely to deviate is the type for
whom it is least disadvantageous.
We will explore the theory by means of quantitative examples drawn from the
experimental literature.  It is well known that there is considerable learning taking place
in the early rounds of experiments.  Since our model is a theory of equilibrium, we focus
on experiments in which players get several opportunities to play, and focus on the
outcome in the final rounds after the players have had time learn an equilibrium.  Our
goal is to explain why, even after the system appears to have stabilized, play does not
resemble an equilibrium with traditional preferences.  Our ideal experimental design is
one in which players are matched with different opponents every period, so that we may
legitimately ignore repeated game and reputational effects between rounds.   With the
exception of the public goods experiments of Isaac and Walker [1988], all the
experiments reported here follow that design.  The results of Isaac and Walker [1988] are9
included because, despite the possibility that repeated effects might have mattered, the
experimental design was well suited in other respects for examining the theory described
here.
3.  Other Models of Altruism and Fairness
Before studying specific experimental data using the model of altruism outlined in
the previous section, it is useful to put the model in a broader perspective.  The model
described can be viewed as a particular parameterization of a class of models in which
preferences depend on payoffs to an individual player and to his rivals, as well as
depending on his own type and the type of his rivals.  As we indicated, because of the
stakes involved in the experimental setting, we have chosen a parameterization that is
linear in monetary payoffs.  This specification would obviously be unsuitable in a setting
where the stakes were large.
Within the linear framework, we can consider a broader class of models in which
adjusted utility is given by
vu u ii i j j ji =+
¡ Í b ,
and the coefficients bij  are determined from players types or other details about the
game.  For example, Ledyard [1995] proposes a specification in which bg ij i j
f
j uu =- () ,
where uj
f  is a “fair amount” which he does not define.  A more detailed specification can
be found in Rabin [1993] who assumes that a player is interested in what is fair for
himself, rather than what is fair for the other player.  His specification is bg ij i i i
f uu =- ()
where the “fair amount” is a fixed weighted average of the maximum and minimum
Pareto efficient payoff given player i’s own choice of strategy, and the coefficient g i
itself is endogenous in a somewhat complicated way. Both of these theories suppose that
players care about whether their opponents play “fairly” and run into the problem that
there is no obvious notion of fairness that applies to all games.  The strategy of the
specification we have chosen is to suppose that players do not care about whether their10
opponents play “fairly,” but rather whether their opponents are nice people.  This has the
advantage that there is no need to answer the question of what is “fair.”
4. Ultimatum
We begin with the study by Roth et al [1991] on ultimatum bargaining in four







Player 1 demands an amount x between 0 and $10.
5  Player 2 may either accept or reject.
If he accepts, player 1 gets the demanded amount, and player 2 gets the remainder of $10.
If he rejects neither player receives anything.
In the usual selfish case where the altruism coefficient is ai = 0 for all players,
player 2 should accept any demand less than $10.  Subgame perfection then requires that
player 1 demand at least $9.95.
6  The actual results of the experiments were quite
different. Table 1 below pools results
7 of the final (of 10) periods of play in the 5
experiments reported in Roth et al [1991], with payoffs normalized to $10.  It should be
emphasized that in order to eliminate as much as possible the effect of learning, only data
                                                
5 This is the base case.  In other countries than the United States payoffs were calibrated to match $10 US in
local currency.  In one treatment in the US the payoff was $30 rather than $10.  Since the magnitude of the
payoffs do not matter for the theory here, we normalized all the payoffs to $10.
6 Players were constrained to demands stated in units equivalent to $0.05.
7 All four countries are pooled.  There are differences between the results of the different treatments, but
even with the pooled data, the evidence on altruism is very limited, as we shall see.  While the differences
are statistically significant, they are not large in absolute terms (in the US demands were generally $5, in
Israel generally $6).  Since the theory says the treatments should not make a difference we elected to pool
the data.11
from the last of 10 rounds is used.  The majority of players demanded no more than $6
and many demands of less than $10 are rejected.
Table 1
The altruistic model has implications for this game, independent of the
distribution  F.
Proposition 1: Regardless of F, in no sequential equilibrium will any demand be made
for less than $5.00, and any demand of $5.00 or less will be accepted.
Proof:  First observe that 10 0 -+ > xx b  if -< 1 b  and x £5, so indeed any demand of
















demand of less than $5.00 can be increased without reducing the probability it will be
accepted, it cannot be optimal to make such a demand.
n
In fact in the data only one demand of less than $5.00 was ever made, and it was for $4.75
and was accepted, so the data are consistent with Proposition 1.
To simplify the remainder of the analysis, it will be convenient to pool the results.
The demands are grouped into three categories: demands in the range $4.75-$5.25 are
treated as $5.00 demands; demands in the range $5.50 to $6.50 are treated as $6.00
demands, and demands of $6.75 and higher are treated as $7.00 demands.  For simplicity,
we will only allow players to make demands in even dollars. The pooled data is
summarized in Table 2; the column labeled “Adjusted Acceptance” is explained below.








$5.00 37 28% 37 1.00 1.00
$6.00 67 52% 55 0.82 0.80
$7.00 26 20% 17 0.65 0.65
Table 2
We will assume that the distribution F of altruism coefficients places weight on
three points aa a >> 0 .  We refer to these as the altruistic, normal and spiteful types of
players.  Since there are three demands made in equilibrium, and more altruistic types
will prefer to make lower demands, we will look for an equilibrium in which the altruistic
types demands $5.00, the normal type $6.00 and the spiteful type $7.00.  Consequently
the probabilities of the three types must be 0.28, 0.52 and 0.20 respectively, as this is the
frequency of demands in the sample.  The $5.00 demand is clearly accepted by all three
types.  The $6.00 demand is accepted by 82% of the population.  However, because of13
sampling error, it is impossible to reject the hypothesis that the actual acceptance rate is
0.80 at less than a 28% level of confidence.  Since 80% of the population corresponds to
the spiteful types rejecting the demand, we will assume that this is in fact the actual
acceptance rate (the column “Adjusted Acceptance” in Table 2).  In other words, we
assume that the $6.00 demand is rejected by the spiteful types and accepted by the normal
and altruistic types.  The $7.00 demand is accepted by 65% of the population,
corresponding to all the altruistic types (28%) and a fraction 71% (071 052 037 ... ´») of
the normal types.  This implies that the normal types must be indifferent between
accepting and rejecting the $7.00 demand.
Based on these considerations, we can characterize the parameters consistent with
equilibrium by means of 6 incentive constraints given in Lemma A in the Appendix. Our
next set of results examines more closely which parameter values are consistent with the
data.
Proposition 3: There is no sequential equilibrium with l=0.











 (also equation (6) in Lemma A).  Setting l = 0, we see that a0 37 =- / ; that is, the
normal type must be relatively spiteful.  But we may calculate in this case that the utility
the normal type gets from making the $6.00 demand is $3.43, while the utility from
making the $7.00 demand is $3.71.  This contradicts the fact that the normal type must
prefer the $6.00 demand.
n
This is actually a corollary of the next proposition, but we give a separate proof, because
of the importance of the result.  What this proposition says is that a model of pure14
altruism is not consistent with the data from the ultimatum experiments.  The problem is
that the acceptance of demands is such that players must be relatively spiteful.  But
spiteful players would not make the modest demands observed in ultimatum.  We have
experimented with several other specifications of the distribution of the coefficient of
altruism in the model of pure altruism, and none can explain this feature of the data.
Proposition 4: In sequential equilibrium -£ £ - .. 301 095 0 a ,  -< < - 10 7 3 a . ,
0584 0222 .. ³³ l .
Proof:  From manipulating the incentive constraints characterizing and equilibrium; see
the Appendix for details.
n
There are a variety of parameter values for which there are sequential equilibria
consistent with the data. Each column of Table 3 gives a set of parameter values for
which there exists an equilibrium of the type described that is consistent with the data.
.
a 0.10 0.30 0.40 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
a0 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.27 -0.26 -0.20
a -0.90 -0.90 -0.90 -0.90 -0.87 -0.90 -0.90
l 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.36 0.35 0.49
Table 3
As can be seen a wide range of values of a  is consistent with the data.  Experimentation
indicates somewhat less flexibility in the remaining parameters than is indicated in
Proposition 3.  In particular, it appears to be difficult to get a larger than -0.87 (versus
the known lower bound of -0.73).  Values of l are difficult to find lower than 0.35
(against the known lower bound of 0.22).  Values of l  are difficult to get higher than
0.49, as against the known upper bound of 0.58.  We were also unable to discover15
equilibria with values of a0 below -0.2, although the known lower bound is only -.301.
The parameters l=045 . ,  a =- 09 .  and a0 022 =-.  lie in the midrange of parameter
values consistent with proposition 3, and with the range of parameters experimentation
shows is feasible.  Moreover, from the table above, these parameters are consistent with a
wide variety of different values of a .   In the remainder of the paper, in evaluating other
experiments, we will, somewhat arbitrarily, choose to work with these parameter values.
While we have found a set of parameter values that is consistent with both
sequential equilibrium and with the data.  One question we have not yet answered is how
much predictive power the theory has.  In particular, for our favored parameter values, are
there other sequential equilibria than the one found in the data?  In particular can there be
a pooling equilibrium in which all players play the same way?  The question is
affirmative:
Proposition 5: If l=045 . ,  a =- 09 . ,  a0 022 =-. ,  a = 029 .
8 and the corresponding
probabilities of the spiteful, normal and altruistic groups are 020 052 028 . , . , .  then there are
two pooling equilibrium outcomes that are sequential: one in which all demands are
$7.00 and one in which all demands are $8.00.  In both cases, the sequential equilibrium
offers are accepted by normal and altruistic types, and rejected by the spiteful types.
Proof:  By computation; see the Appendix
n
The predictive power of the theory is about what we would expect from a
signaling model.  As usual, it is difficult to rule out pooling at different levels, and likely
there are several separating equilibria as well as the one observed.  On the other hand, it is
by no means true that anything is an equilibrium, and indeed, we are able to rule out
pooling equilibria at $5.00, $6.00, $9.00 and $10.00 which was not a priori obvious.
                                                
8 The value of a  is the estimate from the Centipede experiment discussed below, and is in the range
consistent with the separating equilibrium observed in ultimatum.16
Notice also that while these pooling equilibria are inconsistent with the data, they are
considerably close to the data than the equilibrium without altruism in which only very
large demands are made, and all are accepted.
5.  Competitive Auction
For any value of l  if the distribution F of altruism coefficient a is degenerate
placing all weight on a = 0 the model is the traditional model of all selfish players.  Thus
the extent to which the distribution F distributes weight away from the origin measure the
extent to which the model is different than the selfish players model.  To explain the
ultimatum experiments, the departure from the selfish players model is quite large.   For
example, at least 20% of the population as a group has a mean coefficient of -0.73 or
worse; even the middle group of 52% of the population seems to have a substantial
degree of spite.  In other words, we are proposing a substantial departure from the model
of selfish agents.  This, however, poses a potential problem: in many experiments,
especially in market games, double oral auctions, and so forth, the model of selfish agents
explains the data well.  If the model proposed here is useful, then it must continue to
explain the results of games already explained by the selfish player model.
From an intuitive perspective, the experiments in which the selfish player model
has worked well are experiments with a high degree of competitiveness.  In a relatively
competitive environment, player can have a significant effect on their own utility, but it is
difficult for them to transfer utility to or from other players.  Consequently, we might
expect that spite or altruism would play very little role in such environments.  To explore
this issue, we turn now to another experiment conducted by Roth et al under very similar
conditions to the ultimatum experiment reported above.  We argue that regardless of the
distribution of altruism and spite in the population, we would expect to see the
competitive equilibrium occur in this experiment (as was indeed observed).17
In the market game experiment nine identical buyers submit an offer to a single
seller to buy an indivisible object worth nothing to the seller and $10.00 to the buyer.  If
the seller accepts he earns the highest price offered, and a buyer selected from the
winning bids by lottery earns the difference between the object’s value and the bid.  Each
player participates in 10 different market rounds with a changing population of buyers.
This game has two subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes: either the price is $10.00, or
everyone bids $9.95.  In fact by round 7 the price rose to $9.95 or $10.00 in every
experiment, and typically this occurred much earlier.
Altruistic equilibria may be partially characterized by:
Proposition 6: In any sequential equilibrium all offers of $5.00 or better are accepted.
There exist sequential equilibria in which buyer offers are independent of how altruistic
they are and the seller always sells.  If other buyer offers are independent of how altruistic
they are and the seller always sells, then buyer preferences are independent of how
altruistic the buyer is.  Consequently the set of sequential equilibria in which buyer offers
are independent of how altruistic they are is independent of the distribution of altruism in
the population.
Proof:  Let b  be the coefficient of altruism adjusted for the opponent’s altruism.  If the
seller accepts an offer of x he gets xx +- b() 10 ; if he rejects he gets 0.  Hence he accepts
if  xx +- ³ b() 10 0.  Since b >- 1 this is true provided that x ³ $5.00, so all offers of
$5.00 or better are accepted, just as in the case of bargaining.
Turning to the buyers, if there are multiple offers at $10.00 then no buyer can have
any effect on their own utility, since the seller always gets $10.00 and the buyers $0.00
regardless of how any individual buyer deviates.  More generally, suppose that buyer
offers are independent of how altruistic they are, and the seller always buys.  The key
observation is that by bidding low a buyer does not prevent the transaction from taking
place, he merely fails to get a valuable item for himself.  In particular, if the buyer fails to18
buy, but the transaction takes place anyway, this yields a net benefit to the rest of the
population of 10. In other words, an offer x accepted with probability p gives utility
px x p p x (( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 10 1 10 10 1 10 -+ +- = +- - bb b b
which regardless of b  are the same preferences as  p x () 10- .  Since preferences are
independent of altruism, players are willing to use strategies that are independent of how
altruistic they are, so every equilibrium without altruism is an equilibrium with altruism.
n
6. Centipede
So far we have merely fit parameters to observations; when the model with l = 0
did not fit the data, we simply introduced a new parameter to explain the results.  To
actually test the theory, we must hold fixed the parameters we found from ultimatum, and
use them to explain the results of a different experiment.   One famous experiment that is
not explained well by selfish players is grab-a-dollar, and we will next examine such an
experiment.
The specific experiment is a variation on grab-a-dollar that McKelvey and Palfrey
[1992] call the centipede game.  The extensive form, together with the actual conditional
probabilities of moves computed from the 29 experiments over the last 5 of 10 rounds of
play, is reported in Figure 2.  Each round, players played against an opponent they had not
previously played against so repeated game effects should not be an issue here.19
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Without altruism, these results do not make much sense: 18% of player 2’s that
reach the final move choose to throw away money, for example.  Moreover, with normal
preferences, the unique Nash equilibrium is for all player 1’s to drop out immediately.
Note however, that altruistic players may wish to give money away at the end, since the
gain to the other player is much greater than the loss, and that this will give other players
reason to stay in the game.  Notice also that there is a kind of reputation effect of the type
discussed by Fudenberg and Levine [1989], in the sense that by staying in a player signals
he is an altruistic type, and as a result is more likely to receive kind treatment from his
opponent.
We will model this game using the same model of three types we used to analyze
ultimatum.  We will assume l=045 . ,  a =- 09 .  and a0 022 =-. , which are parameters
that have been narrowed down by the data on ultimatum.  The probabilities of the
spiteful, normal and altruistic groups are 020 052 028 ., ., . respectively.  Notice that
virtually no player 1’s drop out in the first move, so that the distribution of types the
second time player 1 moves should be essentially the prior distribution.  Moreover, in this
second move by player 1, 25% of the players choose to continue, which, within the
margin of sampling error, is quite close to the 28% of player 1’s that are altruistic.  So we
will assume that in player 1’s final move, all the altruistic types pass, and all the other
types take, and we will analyze the following modified data20
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We examine the play of player 2’s at the final node first.  Since spiteful and
normal types will drop out before altruists, and fewer players pass than the 28% of the
population that are altruists, we conclude that the altruistic types must be indifferent
between passing and taking.  Since all player 1’s are known to player 2 to be altruists at
















From this we may calculate a =» 27 0 2 9 / . .  This is one of the wide range of values
consistent with the ultimatum data.  Notice that this does not yet represent a test of the
theory; we are merely calibrating the final parameter that was not pinned down by the
ultimatum experiment.  However, now that the entire distribution of altruism is pinned
down, we can test the theory be asking whether the decisions of players in earlier rounds
are consistent with the theory.
We consider player 1’s final decision to pass or take.  Since 51% of the player 2’s
previously passed, including all the altruistic player 2’s, this means that 028 051 055 . / .. =
of the player 2’s are altruists and the remaining 0.45 are normal types.  If player 1 takes,














His utility if he takes is 160 040 155 .. . += aT .  On the other hand, if he passes, he has a
0.18 chance of an altruistic opponent and getting $6.40 for himself and $1.60 for the
opponent, resulting in a utility of $6.31.  He also faces a 0.82 chance of an opponent who21
is  045 082 055 . / .. =  likely to be normal and 0.45 likely to be altruistic.  This yields a
utility of  $0.33.  Averaging over his opponent passing and taking in the final round, yield
the expected utility to passing of $1.40, less than the utility of taking.  In other words, the
normal type should take.  This implies the spiteful type should take, and it is apparent
from the fact that the normal type is nearly indifferent that the altruistic type should pass.
This is as the data suggest.
Continuing on in this way, we can at each node compute the utility from taking
and passing as shown in Table 4:
Node Type Take Utility Pass Utility Difference
1’s last move a0 $1.55 $1.40 $0.14
2’s first move a0 $0.76 $0.85 -$0.09
1’s first move a $0.33 $0.49 -$0.16
Table 4
From the table we see that the spiteful type 1 player is never the less willing to pass in the
first period.  The only inconsistency is that the normal type of player 2 in his first move
should be indifferent between passing and taking, and in fact prefers to pass.  Notice
however, that we have made no effort to calibrate any of the parameters to the exact
indifference of this type, and despite this, the preference for passing is very slight: a mere
$0.09 advantage.  In fact the data seem strikingly consistent with the model and the
estimates of altruism and spitefulness from the ultimatum game and the final period of
this game.
One way to understand how well this model explains the data is to compare it to
the standard non-altruistic model.  In Fudenberg and Levine [1996] we argue that an
appropriate metric for measuring departures from the theory is the expected loss of
players.  We just calculated these losses for the altruism model.  The results are
summarized below in Table 5.  Here the column marked loss replicates the final column22
of Table 4.  The column marked population is the fraction of players (of both types) who
suffer the loss.   The second two columns report the same data for selfish players.  The
basis of the calculation it is optimal for a selfish player to pass in every round but the
final one.  In the penultimate round, player 1 can gets an expected money earning of
$1.80 by passing; in his first move, player 2 gets an expected money earning of $1.18 by
passing, while in the first move, it is worth $1.02 for player 1 to pass.  We do not include
the losses of selfish player 1’s that give money away in the final round, since in the
altruism model we used this data to fit a free parameter.
Altruism Model Standard Model
Node Loss Population Loss Population
1’s last move $0.00 $0.20 0.17
2’s first move $0.09 0.17 $0.38 0.23
1’s first move $0.16 0.04 $0.62 0.04
Table 5
We can summarize the results of this table by computing an overall expectation: the
deviation from the theory in the altruism model is an expected loss per player per game of
about 1.5¢.  By way of contrast, the deviation of the data from the standard model of
selfish players is an expected loss per player per game of about 14.5¢, nearly an order of
magnitude higher.
7.  Public Goods Contribution Game
It is well known that there is a great deal of altruism in public goods contribution
games.   Our examination of ultimatum bargaining and centipede suggests a relatively
spiteful population with few (28%) altruists.  Can this be reconciled with the large
amount of altruism found in public goods contribution games?  To answer this question,
we examine a public goods contribution game studied by Isaac and Walker [1988].23
The game is a simultaneous move n person game, in which each individual must
decide whether or not to contribute a number of tokens to a common pool, or consume
them privately.  If mi  is the number of tokens contributed (we may normalize so that the
total number of available tokens per player is 1), the direct utility is given by




There were four different treatments  (pairs of values of g ,n), and each treatment was
repeated 6 times.
As in the case of ultimatum and centipede we assume l=045 . ,  a =- 09 . ,
a0 022 =-.  and a = 029 . .  The corresponding probabilities of the spiteful, normal and
altruistic groups are 020 052 028 . , . , .  respectively.  We may calculate the mean population
altruism equal to  $ . a =- 021.  An individual contemplating a contribution to the public
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where  $ m i -  is the mean contribution by players other than player i.  Differentiating this















From this we may compute the unique cut-off value a* such that a player with a higher
degree of altruism contributes, and player with a lower degree of altruism does not















Using  l = 045 .  and  $ . a =- 027, we can compute the different cut-off values
corresponding to the different treatments.24
In the actual experiment four treatments were used with different numbers of
players and different values for the marginal per capital return g . Following Isaac and
Walker [1988] we will consider the final round of play only; each treatment was repeated
three times.  The different treatments, the data from the experiments, and the cutoff
values a are all reproduced in Table 6.   The column labeled m  reports the fraction of
the population that would have had to contribute if all contributions were either zero or
the maximum allowable.
Table 6
We should begin by noting that the experimental design was not ideal in the sense
that it does not reflect the simple one shot model we use to explain it.  In fact players
played repeatedly against the same opponents, and we can not be sure what information
was revealed about their types prior to the final round reported above.
We should begin by observing that most players that contributed tokens
contributed less than the maximum allowable.  This is inconsistent with our theory.
Because payoffs are linear in own and opponents monetary payoff, except in the zero
probability event of exact indifference, the contribution should either be the minimum or
maximum allowable.
9  Although not part of the theory as exposited here, this failure is
                                                
9 It is natural to speculate that this problem could be remedied by the type of non-linear preferences
considered by Andreoni and Miller [1996].  However, while they are equally successful in predicting the
g n m a*
0.3 4 0.00 1.13
0 . 3 1 00 . 0 70 . 3 8
0.75 4 0.29 0.17
0.75 10 0.24 0.0625
mitigated by the fact that both theoretically (see Fudenberg and Levine [1995]) and
empirically (see McKelvey and Palfrey [1995]) there is reason to believe players near
indifference randomize; the partial contribution can be the result of such randomization.
Because the theory cannot explain individual contributions, we take our objective to
explain the aggregate contributions made by the population.  This is measured by m, the
fraction of the population contributing all of their tokens required to match the aggregate
contribution level.
In the first treatment the theory predicts (since ai £1 for all players) there should
be no contributions, and indeed there are none.  In the second treatment, our theory has
28% of the population altruistic with an average coefficient of 0.28; here we see 7% of
the population with a coefficient of at least 0.38, consistent with the degree of altruism
from the previous experiments.
The third treatment yields 29% of the population with a coefficient of at least
0.17, also generally consistent with 28% of the population having an average altruism
coefficient of 0.28.
The final treatment is also generally consistent with the theory: 24% of the
population has an altruism coefficient of at least 0.06.  Notice however, that there were
fewer contributions in the fourth treatment than the third treatment, despite the fact that
the theory predicts the opposite.  This is consistent, however, with the possibility that the
anomalous results of the third treatment are due to sampling error: since each experiment
was repeated 3 times, there are only 12 observations.
If we assume that the large fraction of contributions in the third treatment is due to
sampling error, then we should conclude that the actual fraction of the population that
would contribute should be 0.24; the fraction of altruists 0.28 less the 0.04 of the
population who are altruists with coefficients below 0.17.  If we assume three types of
                                                                                                                                                
aggregate outcome of these experiments, they also have little success in predicting the number of
individuals who contribute nothing.26
altruists with coefficients 0.06+x, 0.17+x and 0.38+x and frequencies 0.04, 0.17 and 0.07
having, according to our previous conclusions, a mean of a = 029 . , then x=0.073, and the
three altruistic groups have coefficients of 0.133, 0.243 and 0.453.
8. Conclusion
The theory fares relatively well in the experiments examined here, particularly in
comparison to the selfish theory, which makes wildly wrong predictions except in the




















































The one really surprising feature of this distribution is the large mass of individuals with
relatively negative coefficients; that is, the group of 20% of the population with mean
coefficient -0.9.
We should point out the significance of this theory for games in which mixed
strategy equilibria are observed.  With selfish players, at the Nash equilibrium, a player
can transfer money to or from his opponent at no cost (since he is indifferent).  The
deviation from Nash equilibrium depends on whether at the Nash equilibrium the
marginal (indifferent) player is spiteful or altruistic.  In the case in which the spiteful27
player is marginal he will wish to transfer money away from his opponent.  To prevent
him from doing so, the opponent’s strategy will have to be adjusted to keep him
indifferent.  In a symmetric game, this means that (with the usual perverse comparative
statics of mixed strategies) equilibrium payoffs will be higher than would be the case with
purely selfish players.  It is known that non-zero sum mixed equilibria differ
systematically from Nash equilibria (see, for example, McKelvey and Palfrey [1995]): it
remains to be seen whether this can be explained by the population distribution of
altruism reported here.
There are several experiments that cannot be explained by this theory: one such is
the dictator experiment in which one player decides whether or not to contribute money to
an opponent.  In these experiments contributions are positive, although with linear utility
and ai <1 the theory predicts no contributions will ever be made.
10  It possible to dismiss
this result along the lines of the partial contributions in the public goods experiment:
players who are very altruistic are near indifferent and are randomizing.  In addition, we
am unaware of any dictator experiments conducted in the same way as the experiments
here where players played repeatedly and had a chance to gain experience with the game.
A less radical departure from the predictions of the theory, but an important one
can be found in recent work by Van Huyck, Battalio and Rankin [1996].  This is a public
goods experiment similar to Isaac and Walker’s, except that players had the opportunity
to be spiteful as well as altruistic.  In fact, despite the fact that the estimates here are that
many players are quite spiteful, very little spitefulness is observed in Van Huyck, Battalio
and Rankin [1996].   There also appears to be less altruism than in Isaac and Walker’s
experiment, which suggests that the experimental conditions may have been different in
an important way, but hardly begins to explain the lack of spitefulness.  There are two
significant ways in which the Van Huyck, Battalio and Rankin experiment differs from
                                                
10 The results of dictator are evidence in favor of the type of non-linearity favored by Andreoni and Miller
[1996], and indeed, their experiments focus on dictator.28
the experiments reported here in which spitefulness appeared to play an important role
(ultimatum and centipede).  The game is a one-shot game, so players could not react to
“spiteful” play by opponents, and the game is a four-player game rather than a two-player
game.
The fact that there was less spitefulness with four players raises an issue about the
theory: we have assumed that the altruism/spite coefficient is independent of how many
opponents there are.  This is sensible in the case of altruism, but one explanation of spite
is that it is really “competitiveness,” that is, the desire to outdo opponents. In this case, it
is not the total utility of opponents that matter, but some measure of their average or
maximum utility.  However, while there is obviously much scope for the systematic study
of how spite might vary with the number of opponents, even the simple adjustment of
deflating our estimated spite coefficients by the number of opponents does not reduce
predicted spiteful play to the low level observed in Van Huyck, Battalio and Rankin.
This is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the extensive form of the game matters:
that is, that retaliation for past poor performance is not due only to signaling of types.
In discussing multi-player public goods experiments, we should mention also the
work of Palfrey and Prisbrey [1997] on altruism and the warm glow effect. They argue
that the value of contributions to other players are not so important as the cost of the
donation; that there is a “warm glow” effect that players wish to incur a particular cost of
contribution, regardless of the benefit.  If the cost is lower, there will more contribution,
but if the benefit is higher there will be no increase in contribution.  They study a 4-
person public goods contribution game in which players must decide whether or not to
contribute a single token.
11 Each period each player would randomly draw a value xi for
his token, uniformly distributed on 1 to 20. If the token were kept, the value of the token
                                                
11 There was also a treatment in which players could contribute up to 9 tokens.29
would be paid; if the token were contributed, a fixed amount g  would be paid to each
player.  The monetary payoffs, are given by
umm ii i i j j
n =- +
= Í xx g
1 .
Each player played 20 rounds with a fixed value of g .  They did this four times
with different values of g . Each round players were shuffled so as to minimize repeated
game effects.
12  We consider only results from the second 10 rounds with each value of
g , so that players are relatively “experienced” and we can observe equilibrium behavior
rather than learning behavior.  Data from their experiment is reported in Table 7 below.
13
Table 7
Because there are relatively few observations in each cell, the data is pooled as indicated
in the table.
The most significant feature of this data is that it does not bear out the Palfrey and
Prisbrey conclusion of a “warm glow” effect.    For a given net cost of contributing
xg i - , far more contributions are made when g =15 than when g = 3, indeed this is true
whenever the cost of contribution is positive.  This raises a methodological issue: their
conclusion is based on a hypothesis test using maximum likelihood estimation in a fully
                                                
12 A repeated game treatment was also considered with little consequence to the results.
13 I am grateful to Tom Palfrey for providing me with the raw data.
g = 3 g =15
xg i - Gain ratio m Gain ratio m
5 1.8 0.00 9.0 0.60
3-4 2.7 0.18 13.1 0.67
1-2 6.8 0.27 33.7 0.79
0  0.88  0.8630
specified model.  To account for heterogeneity, they allow the warm glow effect to differ
from player to player, but not the degree to which they are altruistic.  As a result the
coefficient representing how altruistic players are (the weight on other players’ utility) is
effectively averaged over the population.   Since, as the table above shows, for many
players the slope was zero this specification error leads them to substantially
underestimate the extent to which a portion of the population was indeed altruistic.
While the maximum likelihood approach deals well with the problem of sampling
error, it deals poorly with specification error.   The approach we have taken here is to use
method of moments estimation, and, recognizing that the model is misspecified, to give
easily interpretable measures of the departures from the theory.  This for example, is the
approach we take in analyzing the centipede game, where we use the Fudenberg and
Levine [1996] approach of reporting players’ losses.  Similarly, while the model is clearly
misspecified in the public goods experiment, failing as it does to explain the fact that
individual players do not contribute all or nothing, we can ask the question of whether it
does a good job of predicting aggregate outcomes.   This idea that the model may work
well to explain features of the data we are interested in, while poorly describing some of
the details we are less interested in, is extremely difficult to capture in a maximum
likelihood approach.
Finally, we turn to other implications of the theory that could be tested in future
experiments.  For example, there is a set of implications of the theory for one-player
games that has not been examined experimentally: The theory predicts that spiteful play
should take place even in a one player setting.  In other words, if a single player is given
the option to deprive an opponent of money at a sufficiently modest cost to himself, then
we should observe 20% or more of players availing themselves of this option.  Moreover,
in two move games such as the best-shot game discussed by Prasnikar and Roth [1992],
in which all first players are observed to play the same way, the second mover should
exhibit the same degree of altruism (or spite) when posed with the simple second period31
decision problem with no first player move.
14  In a similar vein, it is possible to confront
players with the same choices faced by the second player in ultimatum bargaining, but
also as a simple decision problem and no first period move.  The theory predicts that this
change will effect the play of the second players due to the absence of signaling by the
first player, but it makes very specific and easy to calculate predictions about the
frequency of acceptance and rejections.  Since this is a two-player experiment, it provides
a more direct test than Van Huyck, Battalio and Rankin that spite involves explicit
retaliation and not merely signaling.   Finally, a referee made the interesting suggestion
that it would be possible to have players engage in dictator experiments, with their
behavior in the experiment announced to their opponent in a subsequent ultimatum game.
According to the theory, relatively ungenerous players in dictator should get poor offers
in ultimatum.
                                                
14 In the full information best-shot reported in Prasnikar and Roth [1992] there is slightly less altruism and
slightly less spite exhibited by the second player than in the experiments reported here.  However, only
eight second players were involved in the experiment, so sampling error is a major problem.32
Appendix
Lemma A: A sequential equilibrium matching the data will be given by parameters























































































































Proof:  We first consider the $5.00 demand.  Since all types will accept this demand, the
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In addition, if the spiteful type accepts, all types will accept the demand.  Since the










However, this inequality is always satisfied for aa , >- 1.33
We turn next to the $6.00 demand.  Since only the altruistic and normal types












For the normal type this must yield more utility than the $5.00 demand (and therefore it














































Moreover, the spiteful type must reject, and the normal type accept (in which case
the altruistic type will also accept) the $6.00 demand.  Since the demand is known to be























Next we have the $7.00 demand.  Since the altruistic and 71% of the normal types



























































The normal type must be indifferent between accepting or rejecting the $7.00
demand (in which case the spiteful player rejects, and the altruistic player accepts).  Since










Notice that this implies that a weighted average of aa 0,  is equal to -3/7; since aa 0 >  this
implies that a0 37 23 >- >- // , which implies the inequality above, that the normal
player accepts the $6.00 demand.
From Proposition 1, we may ignore demands of less than $5.00.  However, we
need to consider demands of more than $8.00.
15 Since in our proposed equilibrium, only
spiteful types will demand as much as $7.00, so we consider the most favorable case for
equilibrium, that in which beliefs are that any demand greater than $7.00 is made by a
spiteful type.   Because the spiteful type has the most reason to make large demands,
these beliefs are consistent with quite strong refinements such as the intuitive criterion
(Cho and Kreps [1987])).  Given these beliefs, it is clear that since normal types are
indifferent between accepting and rejecting the $7.00 demand that only the altruistic type
will accept larger demands.  Since it is most favorable for making large demands, let us
suppose that the altruistic type is sufficiently altruistic as to accept all demands.  In this
case if any type is to make a demand above $7.00 the spiteful type will wish to do so, and
will wish to demand a full $10.00.  The demand is accepted with probability 28%
corresponding to the fraction of altruistic types, so the expected utility is $2.80.  On the
other hand, a demand of $7.00 is accepted with probability 65%, and gives a spiteful type
a utility of
                                                
15 There were actually 4.6% of the offers for $8.00 or more (almost all for $8.00), but we have elected to














Proposition 4: In sequential equilibrium -£ £ - .. 301 095 0 a ,  -< < - 10 7 3 a . ,
0584 0222 .. ³³ l .
Proof:  We begin by showing that the bounds -£ £ - .. 301 095 0 a ,  -< < - 12 3 a / ,
0584 0222 .. ³³ l  hold, then strengthen the bound on a as indicated below.
Note that the lower bound on l  follows from the bounds on a0 and a, and
equation (6) which may be solved for l  as a function of the other two variables.   The
upper bound on l  follows from substituting (6) into (3) and observing that a ³- 1.
Note that equation (6) says that a convex combination of aa , 0 is equal to -3/7.
This implies immediately aa £- £ 37 0 / .  Solving (6) for l  and substituting into the
condition (3) that the spiteful type reject the $6 demand, we find
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Through straightforward algebraic manipulation, it can be shown that it is possible to
satisfy this equation together with aa £- £ 37 0 /  only if a <- 23 / .  Observing that if this
condition can be satisfied at all, it can be satisfied when a =- 1 then yields the upper
bound a0 095 £- . .
Finally, substitute the solution of (6) for l  into (5), the condition that the normal
type prefers to demand $6 rather than $7.  Inspection of the resulting condition shows that
if it can be satisfied at all, it can be satisfied when a =1.  Making use of the condition
that a <- 23 /  yields the lower bound -£ .301 0 a .










Since the right-hand side is decreasing in l , the largest value of a is obtained when l
takes on its smallest value of 022 .  yielding a £- 073 . .
n
Proposition 5: If l=045 . ,  a =- 09 . ,  a0 022 =-. ,  a = 029 .
16 and the corresponding
probabilities of the spiteful, normal and altruistic groups are 020 052 028 . , . , .  then there are
two pooling equilibrium outcomes that are sequential: one in which all demands are
$7.00 and one in which all demands are $8.00.  In both cases, the sequential equilibrium
offers are accepted by normal and altruistic types, and rejected by the spiteful types.
Proof:  Observe from our previous calculations that normal and altruistic players will
accept a $7.00 demand or less even from a spiteful type; both will strictly prefer to accept
a $6.00 demand.  Moreover, a spiteful type, regardless of beliefs about his opponent,
faced with acceptance of both normal and altruistic types, will always prefer to demand
$6.00 rather than get $5.00 for sure.  This means that any pooling equilibrium must
involve all players demanding at least $6.00.  Next, the population average altruism
coefficient is  $ . a =- 021, so that both the normal and spiteful type will reject pooled
demands of $9.00 and $10.00, and the spiteful type will reject all demands of more than
$5.00.  This enables us to rule out a pooling equilibrium at $6.00, since the altruistic type
will prefer $5.00 for certain to $6.00 with 80% chance.  We can similarly rule out pooling
equilibria of $9.00 and $10.00, since the altruistic type will prefer $5.00 for certain to
even $10.00 received with only a 28% probability.  So this further narrows the range of
pooling equilibria to $7.00 and $8.00 demands, which are accepted by the normal and
altruistic type, and rejected by the spiteful type.  These are equilibrium with off-
equilibrium path play in which all types (including the altruistic type) reject $10.00 offers
                                                
16 The value of a  is the estimate from the Centipede experiment discussed below, and is in the range
consistent with the separating equilibrium observed in ultimatum.37
on the grounds that only spiteful types make them.  In this case even the spiteful type
prefers to have an $7.00 offer accepted 80% of the time by an altruistic or normal type, to
having a $9.00 offer accepted 28% of the time by the altruistic type.  Similarly, the
altruistic type prefers $7.00 80% of the time against $5.00 for certain.  Consequently both
of these are equilibria.  Notice that like the separating equilibrium, these pooling
equilibria satisfy plausible refinements based on monotonicity: higher demands are
thought to be made by less altruistic types.
n38
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